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Abstract. The paper proposes two axioms that capture the idea of sustainable
development and derives the welfare criterion that they imply . The axioms require
that neither the present nor the future should play a dictatorial role.
Theorem 1 shows there exist sustainable preferences, which satisfy these axioms .
They exhibit sensitivity to the present and to the long-run future, and specify
trade-offs between them . It examines other welfare criteria which are generally
utilized : discounted utility, lim inf. long run averages, overtaking and catching-up
criteria, Ramsey's criterion, Rawlsian rules, and the criterion of satisfaction of basic
needs, and finds that none satisfies the axioms for sustainability .
Theorem 2 gives a characterization of all continuous independent sustainable
preferences . Theorem 3 shows that in general sustainable growth paths cannot be
approximated by paths which approximate discounted optima . Proposition 1
shows that paths which maximize the present value under a standard price system
may fail to reach optimal sustainable welfare levels, and Example 4 that the two
criteria can give rise to different value systems .
Economics is at a crossroads created by two major trends . One is advances in
information technology, which are changing the way we work, live and think . The
other is the environmental agenda, which leads us to reconsider the foundations of
economics, the central question of resource allocation . Economics traditionally
This paper was prepared for a presentation on Reconsideration of Values at the Stanford
Institute for Theoretical Economics, organized by K.J. Arrow in July 1993 . It was also
presented at Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Seminar in Montreux, Switzer-
land, March 1994, at a Seminar on Inconmensurability and Values at Chdteau du Baffy,
Normandy, April 1994, and at the Graduate School of Business of Stanford University in
May 1994. e mail gc@columbia.edu.
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considers resources as passive, so to say "there for the taking" . But many resources
are alive, like forests or biodiversity, and even those which are not alive have their
own rational and dynamics, such as the planet's atmosphere or its water bodies .
The interaction of resources with human organizations such as markets requires
attention now because for the first time in history, human activity has reached
levels at which it can alter the global environment, such as the planet's climate and
its biological mix.
Understanding the interaction between resources and human organizations
is not easy . While economic motives are the driving force behind the exhaustion of
resources, the destruction of biodiversity and the changes to the atmosphere,
economics does not measure and therefore cannot perceive properly the conse-
quences, which are biological or geophysical cause and effect are separated . Each
science sees only one side of the equation .
The need for reformulating the economics of resource allocation is plain to
outsiders who demand it, but takes an abstract and rarefied form for the economist.
It appears for example as a call for "sustainable development" strategies within
international organizations', a term which has not been well defined until now and
which many still consider undefinable . Nonetheless, the useful survival of econ-
omics as a discipline lies in its ability to adjust its principles and its analysis
and to offer needed insights and policies . We must ask what is sustainable
development, and we must find an answer on which economics can be built reliably
and usefully .
In the broadest sense, sustainable development means development which gives
an equal opportunity to future generations . Current patterns of development
conjure up images of "slash and burn" industrialization . The industrial countries
with the highest levels of income consume most of the earth's resources, and
generate most of the carbon emissions from their burning of fossil fuels' . Global
carbon emissions generated since the second world war are generally believed to
have the ability to alter seriously the earth's climate, although there is as yet no
scientific agreement on the precise magnitude of the effects' . Biologists see the loss
of biodiversity during the last fifty years as one of the four or five largest incidents
of destruction of life in the planet' .
The evidence of the last fifty years shows that carbon emissions and biodiversity
loss are inversely related to population growth [43] . Carbon emissions are posi-
tively related to a country's income, because they are closely connected with energy
use. Industrial countries which have s of the world's population, the highest income
levels and the lowest population growth, use most of the world's produced energy
and correspondingly emit about 70% of the world's carbon, while developing
countries which contain about s of the world's population and the highest rates of
population growth, account only for about 30% of the world's emissions' . These
observations indicate that current patterns of growth in the industrial countries
may not be sustainable and should not be imitated by developing countries . They
could be incompatible with the sustainable use of one of the most valuable
resources : the planet's atmosphere . Several years ago in the Bariloche Model" we
' E.g . the World Bank, the United Nations and the OECD.
z Chichilnisky [18, 19,43] .
' Coppel [22], Chichilnisky [19], WRI-UNEP-UNDP [43] .
`' [6, 10] .
5 [43] .
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pointed out that the patterns of development followed by industrial societies were
probably not sustainable, and should not be imitated by developing countries . We
introduced and formalized the concept of development based on the satisfaction of
basic needs [10, 11], and carried out an empirical analysis of world development
based on this criterion, which we showed to be more consistent with the planet's
resources and its ecological dynamics [6], [10] .
Further impetus to the same theme was given in 1987 by the Brundtland
Commission which updated the term "sustainability" and anchored it also to the
concept of needs: development should "satisfy the needs of the present without
compromising the needs of the future"' . The 1992 UN Earth Summit in Rio de
Janeiro saw sustainable development as one of the most urgent issues of inter-
national policy : sustainable development is the official charge of a UN Commission
which was made responsible for advancing environmental policy in the interna-
tional arena as embodied in UN Agenda 21 . Other UN conventions cover Climate
Change and Biodiversity, but it has been said that sustainable development
comprises them all . The topic is of widespread interest, and is compelling to many .
But what is sustainable development?
Solow [39] pointed out that recent discussion of sustainability has been mainly
an occasion for the expression of emotions and attitudes, with very little analysis of
sustainable paths for a modern industrial economy. He suggests that sustainable
development means that we are not to consume humanity's capital, in a general
sense which Hicks anticipated [30] . But the replacement of one form of capital with
another is, in his view, acceptable. As a thought experiment, consider the replace-
ment of all trees on the planet by equally valuable capital stock . Are we to deem
this as sustainable development? A large number of people would disagree strongly
with such a view, although many economists would not . There is an ambiguity here
in how value is defined, and in this lies the crux of the matter . How do we define
economic value? What shall we measure, and how?
Value is usually defined in terms of utility . This is almost a tautology in the case
of an individual, but leads to notorious difficulties when attempting to compare the
utilities of different people and of different generations . The definitions given above
suggest that the issue is how to describe value so that is does not underestimate the
futures' interests, so that the future is given an equal treatment . Implicit in this
statement is the idea of fair treatment for both the present and the long-run future .
The challenge is to develop economic theory which formalizes this aim, the equal
treatment for the present and for the future, with the level of clarity and substance
achieved by neoclassical growth theory . The formalization should suggest a pro-
gram of empirical research with clear implications for public policy .
To follow this plan of action, we need to start from a clear notion of how to
rank alternatives and how to evaluate trade-offs . From such rankings practical
criteria for optimality are derived, which allow us to evaluate alternatives and
trade-offs, the essential elements of an economist's task .
This paper proposes simple axioms which capture the concept of sustainability.
They require intergenerational equity in the sense that neither the "present" nor the
"future" are favored over the other . I neither accept the romantic view which
relishes the future without regards for the present, nor the consumerist view which
ranks the present above all . But is there anything left?
1 [9, Ch . 2, para 1] .
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The answer is, perhaps surprisingly, yes . What is left is a characterization of
a family ofsustainable preferences which has points in common with Hick's notion
of income as a "sustainable" level of consumption [30] . These preferences are
sensitive to the welfare of all generations, and offer an equal opportunity to the
present and to the future . Trade-offs between present and future consumption are
allowed. The examples and a characterization of the family of sustainable preferences
appears in Theorems 1 and 2. These show that sustainable preferences are different
from all other criteria used so far in the analysis of optimal growth and of markets.
But how different is this criterion in practice from other standard measures?
Does it lead to different optimal paths from those which emerge from using
discounted utility? Can we always approach sustainable optima by paths which in
the foreseeable future resemble those of discounted optima, albeit with small
discount rates?
An answer to these questions is in Theorem 3 and Example 4 . These show that
sustainable optima can be quite different from discounted optima, no matter how
small is the discount factor . The difference is most striking in decision problems
with irreversibi11ties, which impose constraints today leading to substantial diff-
erences in the long run, as in Example 1 . But the general issue is captured by Hicks'
idea of income, and Solow's concern for not consuming humanity's capital : the
long run has a substantial weight .
It remains to show how practical is my criterion for ranking development
paths and for evaluating projects . This is the subject of companion papers, Beltratti
et al . [7] and Heal [29], which study "green golden rules" and sustainable opti-
mal growth paths . They compute optimal solutions and derive shadow prices
which can be used to decentralize optimal solutions, although possibly not by
the maximization of the present value of profits under standard price systems .'
The axioms and the characterizations I propose have a compelling minimal
logic, but they are by no means unique . They are meant as an aid to formalizing our
thinking on sustainability and as a way of providing a level of analytical clarity
which could improve our understanding . Analytical underpinnings are as neces-
sary for the practical evaluation of sustainable policies as they are for our thinking
of the available options .
2 . The state of the art
The theory of economic growth developed about 50 years ago, and anticipated the
patterns of development which were followed throughout this period . Exponential
growth of population and resource use are viewed as steady states . Most studies of
An alternative name, suggested by Robert Solow is "intertemporally equitable preferences" .
a The "present value under a standard price system" is a value which is defined by a sequence
of dated prices, which defines a (finite) value for all bounded sequences of commodities, see
definition in Sect. 9 . Heal [29] proves that in the standard "cake eating" or exhaustible
resource problem, the solution according to the sustainability criterion proposed in this
paper is the same as that involving a discounting criterion, because the maximum sustain-
able optimal level of consumption in such a problem is always zero . A different solution is
obtained when the problem is modified so that utility is derived not only from the flow but
also from the remaining stock of the resource ; in this case an optimal path uses less than all
the stock, and the exact amount remaining depends on the actual weight that the sustainable
preference gives to the long run .
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optimal growth and most project evaluations rank alternatives using a discounted
utility criterion. However, discounting future utility is generally inconsistent with
sustainable development. It can produce outcomes which seem patently unjust to
later generations . Indeed, under any positive discount rate, the long-run future is
deemed irrelevant .
For example, at a standard 5% discount rate, the present value of the earth's
aggregate output discounted 200 hundred years from now, is a few hundred
thousand dollars . A simple computation shows that if one tried to decide how
much it is worth investing in preventing the destruction of the earth 200 years from
now on the basis of measuring the value of foregone output, the answer would be
no more than one is willing to invest in an apartment.
This appears to contradict the observation that people and their governments
seem seriously concerned with the long-run future and willing to invest substantial
sums of money to control the disposal of nuclear waste or to prevent global climate
change . Both involve potentially disastrous risks and very long time horizons . For
example, a recent OECD study considers a global carbon tax yielding a revenue of
US5150 billion annually' . Practitioners have argued that discounted utility is
inappropriate for evaluating the costs of global warming, given the very long time
horizons involved, and have suggested that the use of a zero discount rate should
be considered" .
Other criteria for project evaluation and optimal growth take into considera-
tion the long-run future, but share a drawback : their insensitivity to present
generations' 1 . They include undiscounted methods such as long-run averages and
lim-infimum rules . In fact, these rules ignore the welfare of any finite number of
generations, no matter how large this number may be .
It is also possible to select development paths using a Rawlsian criterion,
Rawls [37], or alternatively the criterion of satisfaction of basic needs, introduced
in Chichilnisky [10, 11] . In addition, welfare criteria other than discounted utility
have been proposed for evaluating optimal growth paths by Ramsey [36], von
Weizacker [42], Gale [26], and Koppmans [31], Hammond [27], Heal [28] and
McFadden [34] .
It seems fair to say that no criterion has achieved the analytical clarity of the
discounted sum of utilities . This criterion has led to simple conditions for the
existence of optimal paths ; to a characterization of optimal paths, and to prices
which can decentralize a social optimum". In an analytical sense, discounted
utility compares favorably with Rawlsian rules and basic needs, which take into
consideration solely the welfare of the neediest . The latter are rather insensitive,
giving the same welfare weight to any two utility streams which coincide in the
utility of the neediest, even though in one of them infinitely many generations
achieve strictly higher welfare. The discounted utility criterion is, by contrast,
sensitive to increases in utility by any one generation . In fact, the sustainable
welfare criteria introduced here also satisfies such sensitivity : if two utility streams
give identical welfare to all generations but one, and one stream gives strictly larger
welfare to the remaining generation, then the latter ranks higher .
The discounted utility criterion shows its analytical strength when compared
with Ramsey's criterion and with von-Weizacker's overtaking criterion . The latter
9 Coppel [22] and Chichilnisky [19] .'° Broome [8] and Cline [21] .
" Beltratti et al . [7] .
12 See Arrow and Kurz [2], Dasgupta and Heal [24], and Chichilnisky and Kalman [12] .
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3. Social choice and sustainable development
Fig. 1 . The overtaking criterion
cannot rank paths A and B
criteria are incomplete orders which fail to rank many reasonable alternatives . The
discounted utility criterion is, instead, a complete order . The problem is that the
overtaking criterion fails to rank any two paths which switch between overtaking
and being overtaken by the other, as shown in Fig . 1 above. It leads to a seriously
incomplete or indecisive ranking of alternative paths . A similar difficulty emerges
with Ramsey's criterion, which ranks paths according to their distance from
a blissful level of consumption, a distance which is measured according to the area
between the path to be evaluated and the bliss path . Such distances are often
ill-defined, because in an infinite world the measure of the area between two
bounded paths can be unboundedly large. Therefore the ranking is indecisive .
Instead, discounted utility provides a complete ranking of all feasible paths. My
sustainable welfare criterion is also a complete ranking. The usefulness of an
indecisive criterion is limited : In many cases it leads to no choice . As has already
been argued, the task for economists is to develop a criterion for sustainable
development with a level of analytical clarity and completeness similar to that
which has been achieved by the parts of neoclassical growth theory which rest on
discounted utility . Being decisive is an important part of this task .
These concerns motivate the axioms for sustainability, the results on existence
and characterization of the welfare criteria which satisfy these axioms, which I call
sustainable preferences, and the study of the connection between sustainable prefer-
ences and other welfare criteria presented below .
I propose two axioms which reflect a concern for sustainable development . These
axioms are non-dictatorship properties, and as such have a connection with social
choice theory" .
" See Arrow [1], Chichilnisky [20] . In this case we are concerned with fairness across
generations, see also Solow [38], Lauwers [32], Lauwers and van Liederkierke [33] .
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A welfare criterion used to evaluate sustainable development must be a com-
plete order over utility paths which does not assign a dictatorial role either
to the present or to the future, and which increases with increases in the welfare
ofany generation . Axiom I requires that the present should not dictate the outcome
in disregard for the future: it requires sensitivity to the welfare of generations
in the distant future. This, it turns out, eliminates the discounted utilitarian
approach . Axiom 2 requires that the welfare criterion should not be dictated by the
long-run future, and thus requires sensitivity to the present . This latter axiom
eliminates lim inf and long run averages which only consider the very long run . In
this sense, the axioms require a form of symmetry or "equal treatment" of the
present and of the future, one which is reminiscent of the anonymity condition in
social choice" .
Theorem I shows that Axioms I and 2 eliminate all known criteria for
evaluating infinite utility streams used so far . It also establishes that there exists
a well-defined class of welfare criteria which do satisfy the two axioms : I call them
sustainable preferences .
Theorem 2 identifies completely all the continuous independent welfare criteria
which satisfy the axioms" . Continuity has the role of ensuring the existence of
sufficient statistics . When the welfare criterion has the same rate of substitution
between the utilities of any two generations whatever their levels of utility, sustain-
able preferences are shown to have a simple and general characterization .
Because it is important that the axioms should be practical in nature, and
usable for solving sustainable optimal growth problems and evaluating sustainable
projects, companion papers ' 6 study optimal growth models with renewable re
sources l ', in which the welfare criterion are sustainable preferences . These I call
sustainable growth models . The results in [7] and [29] exhibit the extent to which
these axioms lead to a well defined optimal growth theory with the analytical
clarity and substance of neoclassical growth theory . In [7] we characterize a "green
golden rule" which is the natural extension of the "golden rule" of neoclassical
growth theory, and analyze sustainable optimal growth paths. The aim is to offer
a sustainable optimal growth analysis at the level of applicability of neoclassical
growth theory .
Sustainable preferences can of course be used in a general equilibrium context .
When the market economy is infinitely lived, an hypothesis which is often made in
order to eliminate the potential inconsistencies arising from unknown terminal
dates, it may be appropriate and indeed desirable that the traders and the
producers should have sustainable preferences . Indeed, current German national
accounting practices include a concept of sustainability in the determination of
a firm's value . It has been suggested that Universities' budgetary decisions, which
typically involve a requirement of keeping the long run value of the institution
intact, have sustainable characteristics as well" .
t' Chichilnisky [13, 20] .is Continuity has been used profitably in social choice theory for the last ten years, see e.g.
Chichilnisky [13, 14] .
' 6 Beltratti et al. [7] and Heal [29] .
" Chichilnisky [14] .
' 8 I owe this comment to Donald Kennedy, Chairman of the Global Environmental
Program at the Institute for International Studies of Stanford University, and ex-president
of Stanford University .
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4. Sustainability and value
In addition to introducing axioms for sustainability and characterizing the welfare
functions which satisfy them, I show that paths that maximize the present value of
profits may be quite different from a sustainable optimum . In particular, it may not
be possible to decentralize a solution by means of "market prices" as in neoclassical
growth theory" . Theorem 3 and Example 4 show that even if an optimal sustain-
able solution exists and is unique, in general it will not be approximated by paths
which are optimal under discounted criteria, no matter how small the discount
rate .
Environmental assets may therefore have a well defined and substantial value
according to a sustainable preference, but an arbitrarily small market or profit
maximizing value . see Example 4 . The concept of present value of profits may differ
substantially from the value implicit in our axioms for sustainability . In general,
however, there will be some overlap between the two, and some trade-offs are
possible .
5 . Axioms for sustainability
Consider an infinitely lived world, an assumption that obviates the need to make
decisions contingent on an unknown terminal date . Each generation is represented
by an integer g, g = 1, . . . , oe . Generations could overlap or not; indeed one can
consider a world in which some agents are infinitely long lived . In this latter case,
one is concerned about the manner in which infinitely long lived agents evaluate
development paths for their own futures .
In order to compare the axioms and results to those of growth theory I shall
adopt a formulation which is as close as possible to that of the neoclassical model .
Each generation g has a utility function uy for consumption of n goods, some of
which could be environmental goods such as water or soil, so that consumption
vectors are in R", and u,, :R" -. R. The availability of goods in the economy
could be constrained in a number of ways, for example by a differential equation
which represents the growth of the stock of a renewable resource2o , and/or the
accumulation and depreciation of capital. Ignore for the moment population
growth ; this issue can be incorporated with little change in the results" . The space
of all feasible consumption paths is indicated F.
F = {x : x = {xe{y=1,z, . . ., x y e R"{ . (1)
In common with the neoclassical growth literature, utility across generations is
assumed to be comparable . Each generation's utility functions is bounded below
and above and we assume uy :R" -> R+ , and sup.,R.(u,,(x)) < co . This is not
i9 This often occurs because the "cone condition" which is necessary and sufficient for
supporting optimal growth programs with non-zero price sequences, defined Chichilnisky
and Kalman [12] and Chichilnisky [15] is typically not satisfied in sustainable growth
models .
zo See [17, 7] .
" Population growth and utilitarian analysis are known to make an explosive mix, which is
however outside the scope of this paper .
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a restrictive assumption : one cannot have utilities which grow indefinitely in either
the positive or the negative direction when there are an infinite number
of generations" . In order to eliminate some of the most obvious problems of
comparability I normalize the utility functions uy so that they all share a common
bound, which I assume without loss of generality to be 1 :
sup (u9(x9))x,eR' < 1 . (2)
The space of feasible utility streams SZ is
S2 = {a : a = {ay}y= "2, . . .av = uy(XXY=1 .2, . . . and x = {xv}y=i .2, . . . '= F} . (3)
Because I normalized utilities, each utility stream is a sequence of positive real
numbers, all of which are bounded by the number 1 . The space of all utility streams
is therefore contained in the space of all infinite bounded sequences of real
numbers, denoted e~,21 . The welfare criterion W should rank elements of S2, for all
possible S2 a e, .
5.1 . Sensitivity and completeness
The welfare criterion W must be represented by an increasing real valued function
on the space of all bounded utility streams24 W : C,, ~ R + . The word increasing
means here that if a utility stream a is obtained from another /3 by increasing
the welfare of some generation, then W must rank a strictly higher than (3 25 .
This eliminates the Rawlsian criterion and the basic needs criterion, both of which,
are insensitive to the welfare of all generations but those with the lowest welfare.
Completeness and sensitivity eliminate the Ramsey criterion as well as the over-
taking criterion .
5.2. The present
How to represent the present? Intuitively, when regarding utility streams across
generations, the present is the part of those streams that pertains to finitely many
za This would lead to paradoxical behavior . The argument parallels interestingly that given
by Arrow [3] on the problem that originally gave rise to Daniel Bernouilli's famous paper
on the "St. Petersburg paradox", see Utility Boundedness Theorem, page 27 . If utilities are
not bounded, one can find a utility stream for all generations with as large a welfare value as
we wish, and this violates standard continuity axioms .
2s Formally, S2 c Y,, where {y: y = {y9)e=I . . . . : ys e R + , sup y ly.9 l < co} . Here ( de-
notes the absolute value of y e R, which is used to endow y~ with a standard Banach space
structure, defined by the norm II - II in f,,
Ily II = sup ly .yl .
,= 1 .2 . . .
The space of sequences /, was first used in economics by Debreu [23] .
2` The representability of the order W by a real valued function can be obtained from more
primitive assumptions, such as e .g. transitivity, completeness and continuity conditions
on W.
25 Formally, if a > /l then W(a) > W(fl) .
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generations. The present will therefore be represented by all the parts of feasible
utility streams which have no future : for any given utility stream a, its "present" is
represented by all finite utility streams which are obtained by cutting a off after any
number of generations . Formally,
Definition 1 . For any utility stream a E C,,,, and any integer K, let aK be the
"K-cutoff" of the sequence a, the sequence whose coordinates up to and including
the K-th are equal to those of a, and zero after the K-th" .
Definition 2. The present consists of all feasible utility streams which have no
future, i .e . it consists of the cutoffs of all utility streams .
5.3. No dictatorial role for the present
Definition 3 . We shall say that a welfare function W : Z~, -" R gives a dictatorial
role to the present, or that W is a dictatorship of the present, if W is insensitive to
the utility levels of all but a finite number of generations, i .e . W is only sensitive to
the "cutoffs" of utility streams, and it disregards the utility levels of all generations
from some generation on .
Definition 4 . The "K-th tail" of a stream a E e,,, denoted aK , is the sequence with all
coordinates equal to zero up to and including the K-th, and with coordinates equal
to those of a after the K-th29 .
Formally, for any two a, y E C~, let (aK , 7K) be the sequence defined by summing
up or "pasting together" the K-th cutoff of a with the K-th tail of y . W is a
dictatorship of the present if for any two utility streams a, f
W (ca) > W (P) p
I N = N(a, f) s .t . if K > N, W(aK, yK) > W(fK, vK ) for any utility streams
'h 6 E ,~ 21 .
The following axiom eliminates dictatorships of the present :
Axiom 1 . No dictatorship of the present .
This axiom can be seen to eliminate all forms of discounted sums of utilities, as
shown in Theorem 1 28 .
5.4. The Future
For any given utility stream a, its "future" is represented by all infinite utility
streams which are obtained as the "tail" resulting from modifying a to assign zero
utility to any initial finite number of generations.
2a In symbols : a" ='a.,}. =,,2 ._. such that o- ., = a 9 if g _< K, and a,, = 0 if g > K .2' Recall that all utility streams are in /~ and they are normalized so that sup,,= , .2 . . .
(«(9)) = Hail < 1 and sup.a=1 .2 . . .(9(9)) = I1#11 < I-
2 s Boundedness of the utilities is important here, although as shown above, it is not a strong
assumption, see Arrow's [3] Utility Boundedness Theorem.
21 In Symbols : QK = . . . such that a9 = 0 if g < K, and w = a., if g > K.
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5.5 . No dictatorial role for the future
Definition 5 . Welfare function W : zf~, -> R gives a dictatorial role to the future, or
equivalently W is a dictatorship of the future, if W is insensitive to the utility levels
of any finite number of generations, or equivalently it is only sensitive to the utility
levels of the "tails" of utility streams .
Formally, for every two utility streams a, J3
WOO> WO) -
3 N = N(a, f): if K > N, W (YK , ax) > W (UK, #K), VY, a e ~~ .
The welfare criterion W is therefore only sensitive to the utilities of "tails" of
streams, and in this sense the future always dictates the outcome independently of
the present. The following axiom eliminates dictatorships of the future :
Axiom 2 . No dictatorship of the future.
This axiom excludes all welfare functions which are defined solely as a function
of the limiting behavior of the utility streams . For example, it eliminates the lim-inf
and the long run averages .
Definition 6 . A sustainable preference is a complete sensitive preference satisfying
Axioms 1 and 2 .
6 . Previous welfare criteria
While the axioms proposed in the previous section appear quite reasonable, and
they could be said to have a compelling minimal logic, they suffice to exclude most
welfare criteria used in the literature . In this section I define some of the more
widely used welfare criteria, and also provide examples which will be used in
Theorem 1 of the next section .
A function W : e, , R is called a discounted sum of utilities if it is of the form
W (a) _ Ag'.X,, d a e
y=1
where V., A, >_ 0 and A, < co ; A, is called a discount factor . Ramsey's
welfare criterion [36] ranks a utility stream a = {a,},=,,2, . . . e t'. above another
fl = =, .2, . . . e t',,, if the utility stream a is "closer" to the bliss path, namely to
the sequence ~ = { 1, l, . . . , 1, . . . }, than is the sequence fl . Formally,
(1 - ay) :!~ Y, ( 1 - fl,)- (6)
y=1 y=1
A Rawlsian rule [37] ranks two utility streams according to which has a higher
infimum value of utility for all generations . This is a natural extension of the
criterion proposed initially by Rawls [37] . Formally, a utility stream a is preferred
to another /3 if
inf{at,1,=i .2 . . . > inf{9,1,=i .2 . . .
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The criterion of satisfaction of basic needs [11] ranks a utility stream a over
another fl if the time required to meet basic needs is shorter in a than in Q.
Formally,
T(a) < T(l),
where T(a) = min {t : ay >_ b b' g >_ t }, for a given b which represents basic needs.
Theovertaking criterion [42] ranks a utility stream a over another /~ if a eventually
leads to a permanently higher level of aggregate utility than does /i . Formally, a is
preferred to /i if 3N :
M M
VM>N, 57, a.,>_
y=1
fly,
The long run average criterion can be defined in our context as follows: a utility
stream a is preferred to another /3 if in average terms, the long run aggregate
utility' ° achieved by a is larger that achieved by f. Formally, IN, K > 0:
1 (Tim 1 T+M fly),
VT >N M>K. (10)
T Y_y=M y=M
7. Existence and characterization of sustainable preferences
Why is it difficult to rank infinite utility streams? Ideally one wishes to give equal
weight to every generation. For example, with finitely many N generations, each
generation can be assigned weight 1/N. But when trying to extend this criterion to
infinitely many generations one encounters a problem: one usual in the limit, every
generation is given zero weight .
To solve this problem attaches more weight to the utility of near generations,
and less weight to future ones' 1 . An example is the sum of discounted utilities.
Discounted utilities give a bounded welfare level to every utility stream which
assigns each generation the same utility . Since two numbers can always be com-
pared, the criterion so defined is complete. However, the sum of discounted utilities
is not even-handed: it disregards the long run future . I show below that as soon as
the total welfare assigned to finite utility streams is well defined, the welfare
criterion thus obtained is a dictatorship of the present. Therefore the sum of
discounted utilities is unacceptable under my axioms, for any discount factor no
matter how small.
Another solution is offered in the theory of repeated games: here, instead, more
weight is given to the future and less to the present. An example is the criterion
defined by the long-run average of a utility stream, a criterion used frequently in
'° This is only one of the possible definitions of long run averages. For other related
definitions with similar properties see Dutta [25] .
3' With time Robert Solow has suggested making the discounting factor smaller than one
and decreasing : it is possible to show that under certain conditions this is what must be done
to ensure the existence of solutions.
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repeated games. However, this criterion is not even-handed either, this time
because it is biased in favour of the future and against the present. The decision of
ranking one utility stream over another is made on the basis of the long run
behavior of the utility stream, and is quite independent of what any finite number
of generations is assigned . We have jumped from one unacceptable extreme to the
other .
Here matters stood for some time . Asking for the two axioms together,
the no-dictatorship of the present and the no-dictatorship of the future, as
I do here appears almost to imply an impossibility theorem . But not quite.
It turns out the utilities just described are each unacceptable on their own, but
not when taken together . Lets' reason again by analogy with the case of finite
generations . To any finite number of generations one can assign weights which
decline into the future, and then assign some extra weight to the last generation .
This procedure, when extended naturally to infinitely many generations, is neither
dictatorial for the present nor for the future. It is similar to adding to a sum of
discounted utilities, the long run average of the whole utility stream . Neither part of
the sum is acceptable on its own, but together they are. In other words : two partial
answers make a complete answer . This is Theorem 1 below . Furthermore, this is
the only way to get things right, under regularity assumptions independent . This
is Theorem 2 below, which gives a complete characterization of all continuous
sustainable preferences .
Formally, this section establishes that there exist sustainable preferences
which satisfy the two axioms : they neither give a dictatorial role to the present
nor to the future. This is achieved by taking the sum of two welfare criteria.
The first gives a dictatorial role to the present, but is sensitive to the welfare
of each and every generation, for example a sum of discounted utilities . The second
part of the sum gives a dictatorial role to the future, for example, the long run
average of the sequence of utilities . The sum of a dictatorship of the present
plus a dictatorship of the future is neither . This is because the first part of the
sum is sensitive to the present, and the second is sensitive to the future.
Furthermore such a sum admits trade-offs between the welfare of the present
and that of the future . Theorem 1 below shows that sustainable preferences do
exist; they are represented diagrammatically in Fig. 2, which shows the trade-offs
between the present and the future's utilities . The three axis represent the utility
levels of generations 1, 2, and, figuratively, oc . The two triangular planes represent
two indifference surfaces . One gives more utility to generations 1 and 2, and
under a dictatorship of the present these choices would prevail ; however the
second surface gives more utility to the long run, so that under certain conditions
the second surface is chosen over the first. Theorem 1 makes this reasoning
rigorous .
The second part of Theorem 1 shows that all known criteria of optimality used
until now fail to satisfy the axioms postulated here : some, such as the sum of
discounted utilities, are dictatorship of the present. Others, such as the long run
averages, are dictatorship of the future. Yet others are incomplete, such as over-
taking and the Ramsey's criterion, and others are insensitive, such as the Rawlsian
criteria and basic needs . Therefore the sustainable preferences defined here perform
a role that no previously used criteria did .
What is somewhat surprising is that the sustainable welfare criteria constructed
here, namely the sum of a dictatorship of the present and on of the future, exhaust
all the continuous independent preferences which satisfy my two axioms . This
means that all such sustainable preferences must be of the form just indicated . This
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Lim inf U
7.1 . The existence of sustainable preferences
Fig. 2. The 3 axes represent the utilities of finite generations (U(1) and U(2)) and the limiting utility
value Lim inf U . Two level sets of the ranking are shown . One dominates over finite generations but has
a lower lim inf. As the weights on finite generations are fixed, the ranking in these dimensions can be
represented by the intersection of the level set restricted to the U(1)-(U(2), plane with the vertical axis .
The overall ranking is then shown as the sum of this ranking (the countably additive measure) with the
ranking in the lim inf dimension (the purely additive measure)
is Theorem 2, proved in the Appendix . The mathematics needed to make all this
work is not trivial, but the intuition is clear .
Theorem 1 . There exists a sustainable preference W : e~ -> R, i.e . a preference which
is sensitive and does not assign a dictatorial role to either the present or the
future :
W(a) = 7, Ayay + 0 (a),
g = t
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where dg, Av > 0, Es , AY < oo, and 0(a) = limy (ay ) extended to all of e.".
The following welfare criteria are not sustainable preferences : (a) the sum of
discounted utilities,for any discount factor, (b) Ramsey's criterion, (c) the overtaking
criterion, (d) lim inf, (e) long run averages, (f) Rawlsian rules, and (g) basic needs.
Proof. In the Appendix. F1
An intuitive explanation of this result follows . The preference defined in (11) is
sustainable because it is complete, its first term is sensitive to the present, in fact it
increases with increases in the welfare of every generation, and its second term is
sensitive to the long run future .
(a) The sum ofdiscounted utilities is a dictatorship of the present because for every
e > 0, there exist a generation N so that the sum of discounted utilities of all other
generations beyond N is lower than s for all utility streams since all utilities are
bounded by the number 1 . Now, given any two utility streams a, f3, if W (a) > W(fl)
then W (a) > W(fl) - s for some s > 0 ; therefore there exists a generation N beyond
which the utilities achieved by any generation beyond N do not count in the
criterion W . This is true for any discount factor .
(b) The Appendix establishes that the Ramsey's criterion is incomplete ; this derives
from the fact that the distance to Ramsey's bliss path is ill-defined for many paths .
(c) The Appendix establishes that the overtaking criterion is incomplete : see also
Fig . 133 .
(d) and (e) Lim inf and long run averages are dictatorships of the future : further-
more the long run averages is also incomplete34 .
Both (f) and (g), Rawlsian and basic needs criteria, are insensitive because they
rank equally any two paths which have the same infimum even if one assigns much
higher utility to the other generations .
Figure 2 represents two indifferences surfaces for a sustainable preference as
defined in (11) .
7.2. A complete classification ofsustainable preferences
The following result characterizes sustainable preferences . Additional conditions
on the welfare criterion W are now introduced: W is continuous when it is defined
by a continuous function W :&',, - R35 . Continuity has played a useful role in
social choice theory in the last ten years, in effect replacing the axiom of indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives and allowing a complete characterization of do-
mains in which social choice exists, Chichilnisky [13, 1.4] and Chichilnisky and
Heal [16] . A similar role is found here for continuity: the following theorem gives
a full characterization to sustainable criteria which are continuous .
32 The linear map limN(a,) is defined only on a closed subset of Y, consisting of those
sequences which have a limit ; it can be extended continuously to all of /,, preserving its norm
by Hahn-Banach's theorem. This extension is 0 .
3a Other interesting incomplete intergenerational criteria which have otherwise points in
common with sustainable preferences are found in Asheim [4, 5] .
3' Take two sequences : (1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, . . . } and (0, 1, 1, 0,
0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, . . . ) : they are not comparable according to the long
run averages criterion.
3s A function W which is continuous with respect to the standard norm of the space of
sequences y, . The norm is 11ajI =sup,=1 .2 . . .day ;, and was defined above . Different forms
give rise to different notions of continuity but in the context of equitable treatment of
generations the sup norm is a natural candidate.
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A standard property of neoclassical analysis, one which we wish to consider
here as well, is that the rate of substitution between two generations, while possibly
dependent on their level of consumption, be nevertheless independent from their
levels of utility . A welfare criterion W satisfying this property is called indepen-
dent" ; for example, a standard sum of discounted concave utilities has this
property . The characterization of a sustainable criterion W in the following
theorem is given when W is continuous and independent .
The following theorem decomposes a sustainable criterion into the sum of two
functions . The first is a discounted utility with variable discount factors and the
second is a generalization of long run averages . Called a purely finitely additive
measure, this second function 0 assigns all welfare weight to the very. long run.
In particular, 0 assigns the value zero to any sequence with has finitely many non
zero termS37.
Theorem 2 . Let W : C. -. R + be a continuous independent sustainable preference.
Then W is of the form b'a e e. :
W (a) _ 4a, + 0(c0,
y=1
where 'dg, A, > 0, Ey 1 'iv < cc, and 0 is a purely finitely additive measure.
Proof. In the Appendix . 0
8 . Sustainable optima can be far from discounted optima
(12)
The previous results showed that sustainable preferences are substantially different
from all other welfare criteria . It remains however to study how different they are in
practice, for example whether the optimal solutions of problems which maximize
sustainable preferences are substantially different from the optimal solutions to
discounted problems .
To answer this question I shall compare problems which are defined over the
same constraint set, but each of which maximizes different welfare criteria . The
purpose is to explore what difference this makes in practice . An optimal problem
which maximizes a sustainable preference will be called a sustainable problem . If
the welfare criterion is a discounted sum of utilities as defined in (5), I call this
a discounted problem . The corresponding solutions are called sustainable optima
and discounted optima" .
36 See the Appendix. This simply means that the indifference surfaces of the welfare criterion
W are hyperplanes so that it is possible to represent W by a linear function on utility
streams : W (a + P) = W (a) + W(f). Note that this does not restrict the utilities of the
generations, u, in any way ; in particular the u.,'s need not be linear.
3' A finitely additive measure on the integers Z is a function p defined on subsets of the
integers, satisfying u(AuB) = y(A) + p(B) when AnB = 0 ; it is called purely finitely addi-
tive when it assigns measure zero to any finite subset of integers . See also the Appendix .38 Formally, let F be a convex and closed subset of feasible paths in a linear space X Such as
for example X = /'~, or X = R". A vector /I e F is called optimal in F if it maximizes the
value of a function U : X -" R . The vector /l is called a discounted optimum if U : /,~, --r R is
a discounted sum of utilities as defined in (5) : (3 is called a sustainable optimum if U : X ~ R is
a sustainable preference.
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Can one always approximate a sustainable optimum by paths which optimize
discounted problems? Or even better : can one always approximate a sustainable
optimum by a sequence of paths which approximate the solutions of a discounted
problem? The following result gives a negative answer to these questions . It is not
always possible to approximate sustainable optima by paths which approach
discounted optima. Sustainable optima and discounted optima can be far apart."
Theorem 3 . Consider a sustainable problem :
where W (a) =F'1 1 ~ . yay + 0(a) is a sustainable preference and S2 c ~. is the set of
all feasible utility streams . Let a* be a unique sustainable optimum of (13), and
W * = W (or*) . Assume also that there exist a unique discounted optimum #*,for the
problem of'maximizing over the same set S2 the discounted utility Ee , ,1,,a ys° . Then
in general the sustainable optimum a* cannot be approximated by a sequence of
feasible utility streams . . which approximates the discounted optimum /3* .
This is true for any sequence of discount factors {,1  } .
Proof. In the Appendix .
The intuition for this result is in the following example:
Example 1 . Consider an economy which uses trees as a necessary input to produc-
tion or consumption; without this input the economy's utility is zero . The dynamics
of tree reproduction requires that unless the first N periods the economy refrains
from cutting more than a certain number of trees, the species becomes extinct after
K + N periods, in which case there is zero utility at every period from there on . The
economy's feasible set of utility streams S2 is described then as follows : a minimum
investment denoted s > 0 is required during each of the first N periods to ensure
that the utility levels in all periods after the (N + K)-th is above zero . Once this
threshold is reached, then the utility levels in each period after the (N + K)-th
exceed a. Then for every discount factor, there is an N, K for which the sum of
discounted utilities is maximized at a path which leads to the eventual elimination
of the forest. Instead, for a sustainable preference which gives sufficient weight to
the long run the optimum will keep the forest alive and yielding a minimum utility
level E forever. Therefore the two optima are apart by at least e ; any sequence of
paths which approaches the discounted optimum will not approach the sustainable
solution .
39 This result has also implications for the support and decentralization of sustainable
optima (Corollary I and Example 4) . It may not be possible to approximate sustainable
optima by paths which approximately maximize the present value of profits under any
standard sequence of prices. However, level independent sustainable preferences can be used
in certain cases to define shadow prices at which the optimal paths maximize value. These
are "generalized" prices, but they can be given a precise mathematical formulation and
a precise economic interpretation . They value both the short and the long run, and can be
called "sustainable prices" .
'° This result shows that optimizing a sustainable preference may be quite different from
optimizing its "discounted" part. This is why we compare the optimum of W with that of
Z A,a,, One could allow the case where the discount factor varies over all possible discount
factors ; this is considered in Example 4 below .
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9. Sustainability and value
The following corollary and example show that the notion of value derived from
sustainable preferences is rather distinctive. Paths which are optimal under sustain-
able preferences may not maximize present discounted value according to any
standard price system . Therefore, environmental resources with a large value in the
long run, may not appear valuable under a standard notion of present value profit
maximization .
The following example explores the connection between sustainable optima
and the maximization of present value" . A standard price p is a sequence of prices,
p = (p1, . . . , pv , . . . ) which assigns a well-defined present value to every stream,
p(,I) = ~s i p,y,, < cc for all y e e.". There exist continuous linear functions on
e. which cannot be represented in this manner . An example is the long run average
of a sequence a: this assigns a present value zero to every sequence with finitely
many terms. If the long run average was representable as a sequence, in the limit,
it would assign zero value to every sequence, which is obviously not true".
Example 4 constructs a specific economic example.
9.1 . Example 4: A sustainable optimum which does not maximize expected
value at any standard price system
Consider a feasible path /3 e e,,, which maximizes a continuous concave utility
function U within a convex set F = e,, . I will show that at no standard price system
p does /3 maximize present value s . For c e [0, cc) let
u,(c) = 2`c for c < 1/22` and ut(c) = 1/2` for c > 1/2" .
Now, for any sequence c e e'. let U(c) = E,j° 1 u,(c,), which is well defined, contin-
uous, concave, and increasing on e+ . Let /l e e+ be defined by
"Here I consider a special case where the utilities u9 are linear, the problem can then be
formulated readily without introducing any further notation . The non linear case can be
anlayzed along similar lines, at the cost of more notation . General formulations of the
problem of optima and intertemporal profit maximization can be found in the literature
(Debreu [23]); a simple formulation in infinite dimensional space that fits well our purposes
is in Chichilnisky and Kalman [12] .
42 In some cases, the present value coincides with intertemporal utility maximization, see
Chichilnisky and Kalman [12] . Note that if p is a standard price system, represented by the
sequence (PI, pz, . . . ), then by definition this sequence satisfies Z"=, p, < co .
~3 All purely finitely additive measures on Zdefine real valued functions on sequences which
cannot be represented themselves by sequences.
" Footnote deleted.
45 This is from Example 1 in Chichilnisky and Heal [16, p. 369], which is reproduced here
for the reader's convenience . This example deals with the minimization rather than the
maximization of a function over a set, but the results are equivalent. The example constructs
a feasible set F c /.'~~ which is non-empty, closed and concave, and a continuous concave
function U : tf~ -.. R which attains an infimum U(/3) at /1 in F, such that the only sequence of
prices p = which can support (3 in F is identically zero.
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and let"
F = U" = {y E e, : U(y) ? U(/3)}
;a6
F is a closed convex subset of e. . Now assume that p = {p,}j=1,2 . . . is a standard
supporting price system for the set Ufl, p, >_ 0, i .e . p -y >_ p dy E Uu . By the usual
marginal rate of substitution arguments,
Pt = p,2' - ' . (15)
I shall show that p1 must be zero, so that the whole sequence {p,must be
zero . Assume to the contrary that p1 0 0. Define z E e~ by
and z" E ,~',' by
z° = z, if t < n and 0 otherwise .
Then 'd n, z >_ z" so that
P(z) ? P(z°), (16)
but Y' 1 p,z° = n > p(z) for some n sufficiently large, contradicting (16). The
contradiction arises from the assumption that p1 is not zero . Therefore p1 = 0
and by (15) the entire price sequence p = {p, },= 1 , 2 . _ . is identically zero . It is
therefore not possible to support the concave set UO with a non-zero standard price
system" . F1
10 . Conclusions
I have defined a set of axioms which capture the idea of sustainability, and
characterized the sustainable preferences that they imply (Theorems 1 and 2) . I also
analyzed other criteria used in the literature, and found that they do not satisfy my
axioms (Theorem 1) . Discounted utility fails to satisfy the non-dictatorship of the
present, Axiom 2, and in this sense it is not appropriate for the study of sustainable
development . This agrees with the viewpoint of many practitioners, who have
pointed out the inadequacy of discounted utility for analyzing sustainable
growth" . Rawlsian and basic needs criteria are insensitive, since they only regard
the welfare of the generation which is less well-off. The overtaking criterion and its
relative the catching up criterion are incomplete orders . They fail to compare many
reasonable alternatives . This decreases their value in decision making. Ramsey's
criterion has a similar drawback : it is defined as the integral of the distance to
a "bliss" utility level, but this integral can be ill-defined . Even when paths converge
to the bliss point, the criterion may fail to rank these paths if the convergence of the
path to the bliss level of utility is slow . The Ramsey criterion is therefore incomplete
since no finite value can be attached to those paths with ill defined integrals .
as We call this set UO in sympathy with the notation of Chichilnisky and Heal [16] .
" Further examples of phenomena related to the results in Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 can
be found in Dutta [25] .
48 E.g. Dasgupta and Heal [24], Broome [8], Cline [21] .
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Another way of looking at the problem is that in many cases the welfare level could
be infinite . In such cases, it is impractical to use this criterion as a foundation for
policy, since this would involve calculus with infinite magnitudes49 .
The sustainable preferences proposed in Theorem 1 and characterized in
Theorem 2 circumvent all of these problems . From the practical point of view, they
give rise to optimal solutions which are different from those obtained by dis-
counted optimization criteria. Theorem 3 establishes that a path which is optimal
under a sustainable preference may not be approximated by paths which approx-
imate discounted optima.
The notion of value derived from sustainable preferences is distinctive . Paths
which are optimal under sustainable preferences may not maximize value accord-
ing to any standard price system (Example 4) . Therefore, environmental resources
with a large value in the long run, may not appear valuable under a standard
notion of profit maximization .
This may help to disentangle the apparent contradictions in values which were
discussed in the beginning of this paper. I noted that governments and inter-
national organizations seem prepared to invest sums of money which exceed by
several orders of magnitude the discounted value of the planet's economic product
in order to prevent global climate change . If we accept my axioms for sustainable
preferences, the contradiction is resolved . Discounted profit maximization and
sustainability lead to different value systems . Some trade-offs are possible, but the
two values are not the same .
As Solow has proposed, sustainability should allow intergenerational trade-
offs, but no generation should be favored over any other . This standard is met by
sustainable preferences when applied to the "present" and to "future" generations .
The long run does matter and so does the short run . Indeed, independent sustain-
able preferences can define shadow prices for sustainable optima, which can be used
for project evaluation and for the characterization of optimal solutions . Several of
the aims of this paper have therefore been reached, and several of the questions that
we posed have been answered . But perhaps the results open up at least as many
new questions .
It remains to understand the concern for the long run future which is observed
in practice, and which appears formalized in the axioms proposed here and their
implied preferences . Nobody alive today, not even their heirs, has a stake on the
welfare of 50 generations into the future . Yet many humans care about the long run
future of the planet, and the results of this paper indicate that axioms which
formalize this concern are not altogether unacceptable. One may then ask : whose
welfare do sustainable preferences represent?
Perhaps an answer for this riddle may be found in a wider understanding of
humankind as an organism who seeks its overall welfare over time . Such proposals
have been advanced in the concepts of a "selfish gene", or more practically, in
Eastern religions such as Buddhism which view the unity of humankind as
a natural phenomenon . If such unity existed, humankind would make up an
'9 Hammond (see [35]) has defined agreeable paths as those which are approximately
optimal for any sufficiently long horizon, in the sense that the welfare losses indicted by
considering only finite horizons go to zero as the length of the finite horizon goes to infinity.
The criterion is incomplete: it is not designed as a complete order but rather as a way of
indentifying acceptable paths . A similar issue arises with the overtaking criterion, which is
ill-defined in many cases.
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unusual organism, one whose parts are widely distributed in space and time and
who is lacking a nervous system on which the consciousness of its existence can be
based . Perhaps the advances in information technology described at the beginning
of this article, with their global communications reach, are a glimmer of the
emergence of a nervous system from which a global consciousness for humankind
could emerge .
11 . Appendix
11 .1 . Continuity
In practical terms the continuity of W is the requirement that there should exist
a sufficient statistic for inferring the welfare criterion from actual data . This is an
expression of the condition that it should be possible to approximate as closely as
desired the welfare criterion W by sampling over large enough finite samples of
utility streams . Continuity of a sustainable criterion function W : e", -+ R is not
needed in Theorem 1 ; it is used solely for the characterization in Theorem 2.
Continuity is defined in terms of the standard topology of C : the norm defined by
11aO = sup,=i .2 . . .la(9)I-
11.2 . Independence
The welfare criterion W : R is said to give independent trade-offs between
generations, and called independent, when the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween the utilities of two generations g, and 92 depends only on the identities of the
generations, i .e. on the numbers g, and 92, and not on the actual utility levels of the
two generations . Independence of the welfare criterion is not needed in Theorem 1 .
It is used solely in the characterization ofTheorem 2, to obtain a simple representa-
tion of sustainable preferences . Formally, let e* be the space of all continuous real
valued linear functions on ~~ .
Definition 7. The welfare criterion W : t'~ --+ R is independent if da e C,
W(a) = W(/3) - 3A. e fit, A = A(W), such that A(a) = A(#)
This property has a simple geometric interpretation, which is perhaps easier to
visualize in finite dimensions . For example : consider an economy with n goods
and 2 periods . Let a = (a,, a2), /3 = (fl,, I'2) e RZ denote two feasible utility
streams . Then a and /3 are equivalent according to the welfare criterion
W : RZ -. R, i .e . W (a) = W(fl), if and only if there exists a number y = ,u(W ), such
that
(17)
The geometric interpretation of (17) is that the indifference surfaces of W are affftne
linear subspaces of R2 . Independence implies that the indifference surfaces of the
welfare function W are affine hyperplanes in f. . In particular, W can be repre-
sented by a linear function on utility streams . Examples of welfare criteria which
satisfy this axiom are all time-separable discounted utility functions, any linear real
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valued non-negative function on e,,, and the welfare criteria in Theorem 2 . As
already mentioned, this axiom is used to provide a tight representation of sus-
tainable preferences, but is not necessary for the results in Theorem 1 .
Definition 8. A continuous independent sustainable preference is a complete,
sensitive preference satisfying Axioms 1 and 2 which is continuous and inde-
pendent .
11.3 . Countable andfinitely additive measures
Definition 9 . Let (S, ~) denote the field of all subsets of a set S with the operations
of unions and intersections of sets . A real valued, bounded additive set function on
(S, Y) is one which assigns a real value to each element of (S, Y), and assigns the sum
of the values to the union of two disjoint sets .
Definition 10. A real valued bounded additive set function is called countably
additive if it assigns the countable sum of the values to a countable union of disjoint
sets .
Example 2 . Probability measures on the real numbers, R, or on the integers Z,
are typical examples of countably additive functions . Any sequence of positive real
numbers {a.y}q= i,2 . . . such that Y', Ay < co defines a countably additive measure
Ie on the integers Z, by the rule
Et (A) = 7, 'iq, V A c Z.
.qEA
Definition 11 . A real valued bounded additive set function cp on (S, Y) is called
purely finitely additive (see Yosida and Hewitt [41]) if whenever a countably
additive function v satisfies : VA e (S, Y), v(A) < W(A), then v(A) = 0 IVA e (S, Y) .
This means that the only countably additive measure which is absolutely
continuous with respect to a purely finitely additive measure is identically zero .
Example 3. Any real valued linear function V : e~ -" R defines a bounded additive
function V on the field (Z, 7) of subsets of the integers Z as follows :
V A c Z, P(A) = V ((%A ), (18)
where aA is the "characteristic function" of the set A, namely the sequence defined
by
aA = {ayIB=1,2 . . .
a:4= 1 if g e A and ay = 0 otherwise . (19)
Example 4. Typical purely finitely additive set functions on the field of all subsets
of the integers, (S, 7,), are the lim inf function on C., defined for each a e C. by
lim inf(a) = lim inf {ay } . (20)q = 1,2 . . .
Recall that the lim inf of a sequence is the infimum of the set of points of
accumulation of the sequence. The "long run averages" function is another
It is worth noting that a purely finitely additive set function 0 on the field of
subsets of the integers (S, Z) cannot be represented by a sequence of real numbers in
the sense that there exists no sequence of positive real numbers, A. = {An } which
defines 0, i .e. there is no A. such that
b' A c Z,
	
0(A) = Z A  .
ncA
For example the lim inf : e,,, -" R, defines a purely finitely additive set function on
the integers which is not representable by a sequence of real numbers .
11 .4. Proof of Theorem 1
To establish the existence of a sustainable preference W : ec" -+ R, it suffices to
exhibit a function W : e~ --> R satisfying the two axioms . For any a c-,f,,, consider
W (a) = E °° 1 Jycty + 0(a) .
with 0 < 6 < 1, and 0 purely finitely additive and increasing. W satisfies the
axioms because it is a well defined, non-negative, increasing function on e,, ; it is not
a dictatorship of the present (Axiom 1) because its second term makes it sensitive to
changes in the "tails" of sequences ; it is not a dictatorship of the future (Axiom 2)
because its first term makes it sensitive to changes in "cutoffs" of sequences .
The next task is to show that the following welfare criteria do not define
sustainable preferences: (a) Ramsey's criterion, (b) the overtaking criterion, (c) the
sum of discounted utilities, (d) lim inf, and (e) long run averages (f) Rawlsian
criteria and (g) basic needs .
The Ramsey's criterion defined in (6) fails because it is not a well defined real
valued function on all of C., and cannot therefore define a complete order on e',
To see this it suffices to consider any sequence a E C,,, for which the sum in (6)
does not converge . For example, let a = {ay}y=1,2 ., ., where dg, ay = (g - 1)/g.
Then ay -~ 1 so that the sequence approaches the "bliss" consumption path
/3 = (1, 1, . . . , 1, . . . ). The ranking of a is obtained by the sum of the distance
between a and the bliss path # . Since liMN-. Y_y=, (1 - ay ) = limN_"yy=, 1/g
does not converge, Ramsey's welfare criterion does not define a sustainable
preference .
The overtaking criterion defined in (9) is not a well defined function of C , since
it cannot rank those pair of utility streams a, f E e. in which neither a overtakes /l,
nor /l overtakes a. Fig . 1 above exhibits a typical pair of utility streams which the
overtaking criterion fails to rank.
The long run averages criterion defined in (10) and the lim inf criterion defined
in (20) fail on the grounds that neither satisfies Axiom 2; both are dictatorships of
the future .
Finally any discounted utility criterion of the form
W(a) _ ay A y , where Vg, A y > 0 and il.y < co
y=1 y=1
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example : it is defined for each a E e,,, by
1 K+,v
lim ~- 7, ay~ . (21)
K,N-co K y=N
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is a dictatorship of the present, and therefore fails to satisfy Axiom 1 . This is
because
b'y E C~ s .t. sup (Y,) < 1, and 'de > 0,
v=i .z . . .
IN> 0, N= N(e) : Y Y, .l,y < e. (22)
9=N
Therefore, since
W(a) > W(/3) , 3s > 0: W(a) - W(fl) > 3e,
then by (22) 3N > 0 such that Va, y E S2, W((XK , GK) > W(aK, YK), bK > N. The
function W thus satisfies the first part of the definition of a dictatorship of the
present, i .e.
W(a) > W(/3)
3N,N=N(a,/~):dy,QE~~ with jyjj < 1
and jUjj <_ 1, W(aK, Yx) > W(fK, UK), 'dK > N.
The reciprocal part of the definition of dictatorship of the present is immediately
satisfied : if 'du, Y E e, such that Hall < 1, 11911 < 1, W(aK, UK) > W(a", 1K), this
implies W (a) > W(#) . Therefore W is a dictatorship of the present and violates
Axiom 1 .
Finally the Rawlsian welfare criterion and the criterion of satisfaction of basic
needs do not define independent sustainable preferences : the Rawlsian criterion
defined in (7) fails because it is not sensitive to the welfare of many generations : only
to that of the less favoured generation . Basic needs has the same drawback .
11.5 . Proofof Theorem 2
Consider a continuous independent sustainable preference . It must satisfy Axioms
1 and 2 . There exists a utility representation for the welfare criterion W : e~ --> R,
defining a non-negative, continuous linear functional on C. . As seen above in
Example 3, (18) and (19), such a function defines a non-negative, bounded, additive
set function denoted W on the field of subsets of the integers Z, (Z, 57 ) .
Now the representation theorem of Yosida and Hewitt ([41, 40]), establishes
that every non-negative, bounded, additive set function on (S, Y), the field of
subsets 7 of a set S, can be decomposed into the sum of a non-negative measure
ul and a purely finitely additive, non-negative set function uz on (S, F). It follows
from this theorem that W can be represented as the sum of a countably additive
measure Ni, and a purely finitely additive measure on the integers Z . It is
immediate to verify that this is the representation in (11) . To complete the charac-
terization of an independent sustainable preference it suffices now to show that
neither .l nor 0 are identically zero in (11). This follows from Axioms 1 and 2 : we
saw above that discounted utility is a dictatorship of the present, so that if 0 - 0,
then W would be a dictatorship of the present, contradicting Axiom l . If on the
other hand A - 0, then W would be a dictatorship of the future because all purely
finitely additive measures are, by definition, dictatorships of the future, contradic-
ting Axiom 2 . Therefore neither A nor 0 can be identically zero .
aES2
where S2 is the set of all feasible utility streams and W is an independent sustainable
preference . By Theorem 2, W must be of the form
W (a) = Y A, a, + (1 - 0)0(a),
	
b'a E f~~, (24)
y=1
where dg, A Y > 0, Z'O 1 .1 y < co, 0 is a purely finitely additive independent
measure on Z and 0 < B < 1 . Assume that there exists a unique solution to
problem (23), denoted a* and called a sustainable optimum, with welfare value
W * = W(a*) . Assume also that there exist a unique solution, denoted /3* and
called a discounted optimum, for the problem of maximizing over the same set
S2 the discounted utility
max (U(a)), where U(a) = B y 1 Ayay, (25)
UE12 y=1
which is the first term defining the preference W in (24). Then in general the
sustainable optima a* cannot be approximated by a sequence of feasible utility
streams . . . which approximates the discounted optimum /3*, i .e . for all
such sequences
lim max
n-~ao .q=1 yES2
This is true for any sequence of "discount factors" {Ay}y=1,2 . . . satisfying dg,'l.y > 0
and ~y 1 .1y < co .
Proof. I define a family of optimal growth problems, each with a welfare function
of the form (24), and each having a feasible set S2 c 1, all satisfying the condi-
tions of the Theorem. I will show that for each problem in this family, the optimum
a* cannot be approximated by a sequence which approximates the optima #* of
discounted utility functions of the form (ZS) . This is true for any discount factors
A : Z -> R which satisfy dg, .l y > 0, ~y 1 A Y < co .
Define the set of feasible utility streams S2 as follows : S2 = {a E
a = {0t},=1 .2 . . .,Supy (ay } < 1 and 3s > 0, and integers N and K such that if a y < e
Vg < N then ay = Ob'g > K + N, while if ay > ab'g < N, then ay >_ E,
d g > K + N. Each set of parameters E, N and K define a different feasible set of
utility streams 52:
If the welfare function W is a discounted utility of the form (25), then there
exists E, N and K such that the discounted optimum #* _ e S2 satisfies
/3y=1 forg<N+K and #y=0 forg>K+N.
The sustainable optima a* is quite different when in the definition of W; (24), the
purely finitely level independent measure 0 has most of the "weight", i.e . when
B - 0 . Indeed, for B - 0, the sustainable optimum a* satisfies
ay >_a for g>K+N.
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11.6. Proof of Theorem 3
The statement of Theorem 3 is
Consider a sustainable optimum growth problem
max W (av), where ay = {uy(xy)}9=1,z ._ . C-Q C f. . (23)
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Since both a* and /3* are unique, and 11 a* - /3* 11 >_ s > 0, it is clear that a sequence
{#"} which approaches #* cannot approach also a* . This completes the proof of
the theorem.
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